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I. INTRODUCTION
"Essentiality of access" is a useful organizing principle for examining
future communications policies in order to better enable the adoption of
appropriate government interventions. It refers to the historical alignment
of different access problems-that is, access to some essential service or
facility-and the legal principles in the U.S. that evolved to address them.'
It clarifies that different access problems led to the evolution of distinctive
legal principles.
Applying "essentiality of access" to broadband demonstrates that
differing access objectives require reference to distinctive legal principles
that affect different types of legal rights-including both economic rights
and free speech rights under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution-of the access recipients and access providers. Awareness of
the differing rights is necessary to address conflicts among them when
simultaneously pursuing multiple access objectives, particularly when such
conflicts affect constitutional rights of individuals as opposed to
corporations.
1. See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, Utilizing "EssentialityofAccess" Analyses to Mitigate
Risky, Costly and Untimely Government Interventions in Converging Telecommunications
Technologies and Markets, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 251, 251 (2003) [hereinafter
EssentialityofAccess].
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Technological convergence is posing conflicts among access
recipients and access providers that require increasingly complex
evaluation of how to balance the parties' respective legal rights. Such
conflicts are shifting the tectonic plates of longstanding bodies of law,
altering their interrelationships and creating new sources of friction among
legal principles that had historically been viewed as independent of each
other.
For example, free speech concerns were rarely relevant to common
carriers. As providers of only transmission facilities, telecommunications
carriers generally possessed no First Amendment rights (other than as to
tangential operations, such as billing practices). 2 However, mass media, as
providers of information content of their choosing over their own facilities,
do possess free speech rights. With technological convergence and the
elimination of legal entry barriers, the interrelationship of common carriage
and free speech principles is becoming more complex.4 Furthermore, the
free speech rights of broadband providers have been elevated by the FCC's
classification of broadband Internet access services as information services
not subject to common carriage. 5
Imposing baseline obligations on broadband Internet access providers
may give rise to conflicting economic and free speech rights of access
recipients and broadband access providers. Moreover, the nature of these
rights varies depending upon whether the access recipient is an end-user
customer or a competitor in an ancillary market. Importantly, establishing
baseline obligations may give rise to conflicting constitutional claims,
pitting the economic and free speech rights of individuals against those of
corporate interests. Resolving such conflicts further complicates the FCC's
task in its pending rulemaking, Broadband Industry Practices, where it
considers what are often referred to as network neutrality principles.
This Article stresses that, given that policy change is a path2. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4-9
(1986).
3. See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTEIN, REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 292-456
(3d ed. 1998) (discussing different constitutional First Amendment standards in the
electronic mass media context).
4. Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage
Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. Ky. L. REv. 483, 505-10 (2006)
[hereinafter Misusing Network Neutrality].
5. As discussed in infra Part V.B.3, the FCC has reclassified the telecommunications
component of information services offered by broadband providers from a common carriage
service to a non-common carriage information service under the Communications Act of
1934. On the basis of the change in classification, broadband providers of information
services can assert that their free speech rights are not limited to those of common carriers.
6. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064 (2009) [hereinafter Broadband Industry Practices].
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dependent process, establishment of baseline obligations for broadband
Internet access providers must be based on analyses conducted in
appropriate temporal context. Ripping analyses from appropriate historical
context
leads to misleading
discourse,
flawed assumptions,
and the purposes
of
legal
principles
misalignment
and
mischaracterizations,
they were designed or emerged to solve. Grounding analysis in appropriate
temporal context, a critical component of my research has been devoted to
correcting misconceptions and mischaracterizations of the law of common
carriage that unfortunately misinform debates of telecommunications
and
These
misconceptions
to
broadband.
related
policies
mischaracterizations have been created by factual and analytical errors
arising from analyses that either totally ignore or improperly frame
temporal dimensions of the evolution of the law of common carriage and
public utilities.
This Article expands upon this prior research to discuss the
implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission8 for the federal government's attempts to
define obligations of broadband access providers. In Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, the Court overruled some of its prior cases
to hold that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons with
regard to political speech. 9 However, as explained at length in the
dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court's majority opinion
contains numerous analytical flaws, including the failure to conduct a
proper historical analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence and the
Framers' views of corporations, to cite any empirical research to support its
assertions, and to address differences between corporations and
individuals.' 0 Moreover, the Court ignores the need to balance the
competing First Amendment interests of corporations and individuals." As
a result, the Court's holding is a "radical departure from what had been
settled First Amendment law."' 2
This Article also describes how the Court's radical departure from
history under its flawed analysis in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission mirrors the FCC's flawed analysis in its classification of
7. Misusing Network Neutrality, supra note 4; Barbara A. Cherry, Maintaining
CriticalRules to Enable SustainableCommunications Infrastructures,24 GA ST. U. L. REv.
947, 948 (2008) [hereinafter Maintaining Critical Legal Rules]; Barbara A. Cherry,
Consumer Sovereignty: New Boundariesfor Telecommunications and Broadband Access,
34 TELECOMM. POL'Y 11 (2010) [hereinafterConsumer Sovereignty].
8. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
9. Id. at 913.
10. Id at 929-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 976.
12. Id at 948.
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broadband Internet access service as an information service with no
separable telecommunications service component subject to common
carriage regulation. The recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Federal
Communications Commission, in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
recently held that the FCC lacks ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the
Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit certain network management
practices of Comcast, does present an opportunity to reverse the FCC's
radical policy trajectory with regard to the classification of broadband
Internet access services." The jurisdictional defect can be cured either by
FCC reclassification of broadband Internet access services as
telecommunication services under Title II or by Congress through
legislation.14 However, Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, by
elevating the constitutional free speech rights of corporations, diminishes
the federal government's ability to protect consumer interests with regard
to potential network neutrality principles, as neither the FCC nor Congress
can impose obligations suffering from constitutional infirmity. Overall, the
combinatorial or interactive effect of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission and the maintenance of the FCC's current classification of
broadband Internet access services is to effectively elevate the free speech
rights of corporations to wield their economically derived wealth above
both the economic and free speech rights of individuals.

13. 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
14. Since the issuance of the court's opinion in Comcast v. Federal Communications
Commission, there has been confusion as to what is meant by "reclassifying" broadband
Internet access service as a Title II common carriage service. The reference here is to the
FCC's prior classification of enhanced or information service, whether provided through
narrowband or DSL service, as containing a separable telecommunications component that
is a Title II common carriage service. As discussed in infra part V.B.3, in the FCC's Cable
DeclaratoryRuling, the FCC found that cable modem access to the Internet service was an
information service without a separable telecommunications component subject to Title II
common carriage requirements. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over
Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Declaratory Ruling]. This classification of cable
modem access directly conflicted with the preexisting policy for narrowband and wireline
broadband access to information services. After the Cable DeclaratoryRuling was upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 996-97, 1000-01 (2005), the FCC then also reclassified
wireline broadband access over DSL as an information service without a separable
telecommunications component subject to Title II common carriage regulation in its
Wireline Broadband Order. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20
F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order]. Thus, the reference to
reclassification here means for the FCC to find, at a minimum, that all broadband access
services have a separable telecommunications component classified as a Title II common
carnage service.
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II. UTILIZING "ESSENTIALITY OF ACCESS" AS AN ORGANIZING
PRINCIPLE
My prior research has used "essentiality of access" as an organizing
principle for examining future policy objectives in communications in
order to better enable adoption of appropriate government interventions.
"Essentiality of access" refers to the historical mapping of different
problems of access to some essential service or facility to the
corresponding legal principles that evolved to address them. Thus,
"essentiality of access" is an access problem-to-legal principle typology.
The access problems differ depending on
what services or facilities are deemed to be essential; for whom (access
recipient) they are deemed to be essential; the nature of the relationship
between the access recipient and the access provider; and what
circumstances are impeding the accessibility of the service or facility.15
The differing access problems are then mapped to the legal principles that
developed, both under the common law and in statutes, to address them.
This typology is represented in Table 1 below.
Importantly, this typology reveals that different legal principles affect
different types of legal rights--economic rights, welfare-related rights, and
free speech rights-of access recipients and access providers. Awareness of
these different types of legal rights highlights how differing rights may
conflict when pursuing multiple access objectives. As discussed in
Essentiality of Access, broadband policy issues, reflecting technological
convergence, often simultaneously affect multiple access problems and
thereby create potentially new conflicts among economic, welfare-related,
and free speech rights.' 6 The need for government to balance the interests
among these conflicting rights is a complex endeavor.

I5. Essentiality ofAccess, supra note 1, at 252.
16. Id.
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Table 1: Legal Principles to Address Different Access Problems
Regarding Essential Services or Facilities' 7
Access Is
Needed to
Sustain

Relationship
of Access
Recipient to
Access
Provider
Customer as
end users.

Legal
Principle(s)

Obligations of
Access Provider

Economic
coercion;
dependence of
customer
requires
protection.

Common
carrier;
public
utility;
business
affected
with a
public
interest.

Provide access
to essential
service without
discrimination,
at reasonable
rates, and with
adequate skill
and care.

Competitors.

Economic
characteristics
of supply
require access
to
monopolist's
essential
facilities.

Prohibit
refusal to
deal with
competitors
(e.g.
essential
facilities
doctrine).

Provide access
to essential
facility (input)
under reasonable
prices, terms and
conditions.

Equality of
access to
essential
services.

Targeted
customers as
endusers.

Legitimacy
of, and
citizen's
participation
in,
democracy.

Speaker as
enduser or
competitor
(for benefit of
audience).

High cost of
providing
service;
indigence of
customers.
Viewpoint
diversity and
channel
provider's
potential
refusal to deal

Universal
service as a
form of
welfare
benefit.
Free speech
rights.

Contribute funds
to and/or provide
subsidized
essential
services.
Provide access
to channel of
communication.

Provision of
essential
service, not
adequately
supplied in a
competitive
market,
throughout
the
community.
Viable
competition
in a related
market of a
monopolist.

Underlying
Purpose or
Problem

I with

speaker.

As access to broadband is deemed essential, changes in regulatory
policy will be required to prevent adverse effects on intended access
recipients. Policies currently under consideration include revising federal
universal service support mechanisms to provide funding for access to
17. Id. at 255 tbl. 1.
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broadband, and codifying Internet policy principles in BroadbandIndustry
8
Imposing regulatory burdens on broadband access providers
Practices.1
will provoke legal challenges. Illustrative is Comcast's appeal of the FCC
Order prohibiting certain network management practices, recently decided
by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Comcast Corp. v. Federal
Communications Commission.
EssentialityofAccess also anticipated the emergence of constitutional
challenges that will require the courts to consider conflicting constitutional
rights of individuals versus corporations. In particular, it examined
difficulties-thus far unaddressed in broadband policy debates-posed in
those cases where the constitutionality of broadband regulation may depend
upon the characteristics of the corporate form of broadband providers.
Constitutional challenges by broadband access providers will require
the courts to weigh the competing interests of broadband providers and
access recipients. This will pose difficulties for the courts in
conducting the necessary constitutional analyses. Some difficulties will
arise from the need to address conflicts in the differing legal regimes
among now-competing technology platforms. However, this section
discusses difficulties that appear to have been previously unraised in
broadband policy debates. More specifically, the constitutionality of
broadband regulation may depend u on the characteristics of the
corporate form of broadband providers.' 9
Such cases include those involving incompatible free speech interests
between access recipients and broadband providers.2 0
To resolve conflicting free speech interests, Essentiality of Access
noted that "[t]here is precedent for restricting the free speech rights of
corporations to a greater extent than natural persons for reasons directly
related to unique characteristics of the corporate form."' In Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
Michigan statute that prohibited certain corporations from using corporate
treasury funds to make independent expenditures in support or opposition
of candidates in state elections.22 The Court found that the restriction on
corporations' political speech was justified because the State had a
compelling interest to prevent "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support

18. High-Cost Universal Service Support Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, Recommended Decision, 22 F.C.C.R. 20477, para. 29 (2007) (Federal-State Joint
Board recommends a federal Broadband Fund of $300 million per year).
19. Id. at 269-70.
20. Id. at 273.
21. Id. (footnote omitted).
22. 494 U.S. 652, 652 (1990).
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for the corporation's political ideas."2 The statute in Austin did exempt
media corporations from the expenditure restriction, which the Court
upheld because "[a] valid distinction .

.

. exists between corporations that

are part of the media industry and other corporations that are not involved
in the regular business of imparting news to the public."2 4 However, the
Court did imply that placing the same restriction on the press might be
constitutional, stating "[a]lthough the press' unique societal role may not
entitle the press to greater protection under the Constitution, it does provide
a compelling reason for the State to exempt media corporations from the
scope of political expenditure limitations."25
Thus, my previous analysis concluded "Austin does support the
possibility of allowing the government to place restrictions on broadband
access providers' free speech rights for reasons related to characteristics
unique to corporations." 26 Given the dual role of the First Amendment in
protecting interests of individuals and helping to sustain a democracy,
viewpoint diversity27 could be a compelling government interest for
imposing restrictions on broadband providers' free speech rights in order to
provide access to speakers and support an informed citizenry.2 8
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a nonprofit
corporation, Citizens United, challenged the constitutionality of Section
441(b) of the U.S. Code, as modified by section 203 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), a federal law which prohibits
corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make
independent expenditures for speech that is an "electioneering
communication" within thirty days of a primary election or for speech that
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 29 Finding that the
case cannot be resolved on narrower grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of § 441(b) under the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.30
23. Id. at 660.

24. Id. at 668.
25. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
26. Essentiality ofAccess, supra note 1, at 274.
27. Viewpoint diversity refers to a national communications policy in which providing
the "widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" is
deemed essential to the public welfare. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 66364 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at 663.
29. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 880-81 (2010).
30. Id. at 896-99. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging freedom of speech ..... U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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The Court first found that § 441(b)'s prohibition on corporate
independent expenditures is a ban on speech.' It then proceeded to review
the application of the First Amendment to corporations. The Court started
with the recognition that First Amendment protection extends to
corporations, and that this protection applies to political speech.32 Referring
to two earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases reviewing the constitutionality of
campaign financing laws, the Court then stated, "[1]ess than two years after
Buckley, Bellotti reaffirmed the First Amendment principle that the
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker's
corporate identity." 33 Quoting in part from Justice Kennedy's dissenting
opinion in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court asserted,
"[t]hus the law stood until Austin. Austin 'uph[eld] a direct restriction on
the independent expenditure of funds for political speech for the first time
in [this Court's] history."' 34 In so doing, "the Austin Court identified a new
governmental interest in limiting political speech: an antidistortion
interest."35 Here the Court was referring to the "corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form resulting from public support that have little or
no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas."36
The Court then claimed it was "confronted with conflicting lines of
precedent," pre- and post-Austin.37 The Court observed that, in defense of
the restrictions on corporate speech in § 441(b), the Government
(defendant) noted the antidistortion interest in Austin, but relied instead on
two other compelling interests: an anticorruption interest and shareholderprotection interest.38 Of particular relevance here is the Court's analysis of
the antidistortion and anticorruption interests, particularly of the former,
which specifically involved political speech of media corporations.
In addressing Austin's antidistortion rationale, the Court first asserted
that "[t]he rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker's
wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment
generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the
31. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882.
32. Id. at 899-900.
33. Id. at 902 (citation omitted). Buckley and Bellotti refer to two earlier U.S. Supreme
Court cases. See infra notes 121-24.
34. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
35. Id. For the government antidistortion interest to which the Court is referring, see
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990), and supra text
accompanying note 24.
36. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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speaker's identity."39 The Court then claimed, "[a]ll speakers, including
individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic
marketplace to fund their speech . . . . Austin's antidistortion rationale

would produce the dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that
Congress could ban political speech of media corporations."40 However, §
441(b) specifically exempted media corporations, as had the Michigan
statute at issue in Austin.41 So, in addressing this exemption, the Court
stated, "[y]et media corporations accumulate wealth with the help of the
corporate form,"42 and claimed that "[t]he law's exception for media
corporations is, on its own terms, all but an admission of the invalidity of
the antidistortion rationale." 3 Thus, viewing the exemption for media
corporations as a further, separate reason for invalidating § 441(b)," the
Court claimed "[t]here is simply no support for the view that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of
political speech by media corporations."4 5 Furthermore,
The Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or
forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers
and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those
types of speakers and media that provided the means of
communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.46
The Court then concluded that "Austin interferes with the open marketplace
of ideas protected by the First Amendment,"A7 and that "[b]y suppressing
the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the
Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public
and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their
interests.""
As for the anticorruption rationale, under which "corporate political
speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption or its appearance,"
the Court asserted that precedent limits this rationale to situations when
direct contributions were made to secure a political quid pro quo.so
However, the Court stated "[1]imits on independent expenditures, such as §
441b, have a chilling effect extending well beyond the Government's
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 905.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 906.

44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 907.

49. Id. at 908.
50. See id.
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interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption." 5 1 Claiming "that
independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid
pro quo corruption,"s2 the Court found that "[a]n outright ban on corporate
political speech during the critical preelection period is not a permissible
remedy."53
The Court also quickly dispensed with the shareholder-protection
rationale, which asserted "that corporate independent expenditures can be
limited because of [the Government's] interest in protecting dissenting
shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech."5 4 It
does so on the basis that, "like Austin's antidistortion rationale, [the
shareholder-protection interest] would allow the Government to ban the
political speech even of media corporations .

. .

. The First Amendment

does not allow that power."5 5
After discussing its reasons for choosing not to adhere to the principle
of stare decisis to uphold the precedent, the Court concluded,
Austin should be and now is overruled. We return to the principle
established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations."
The Court then held § 441(b)'s restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures to be unconstitutional."
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION
One might argue that the implications of Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission fundamentally lie in recognition of its holding that
the government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's corporate identity. The consequences of this holding are indeed
profound. By overruling Austin, the Court has removed a legal basis for
differentiating the constitutional free speech rights of human individuals
versus corporations, at least in the context of restrictions on political
speech. Consequently, if future cases should require the courts to balance
conflicting interests of human individuals as opposed to corporations in a
manner that implicates First Amendment rights affecting political speech,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id at 910.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 913 (citation omitted).

57. Id. at 917.
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there are very limited circumstances (e.g., to prevent quid pro quo
corruption) under which it would be permissible for government regulation
to choose the interests of individuals over those of corporations.
Moreover, the courts' reticence to uphold restrictions affecting the
political speech of media corporations would be particularly pronounced.
As a result, to the extent that broadband access providers can characterize
obligations placed on them as restraining their political speech, Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission has now effectively elevated the
status of corporate broadband access providers' First Amendment rights.
The impact of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission on
commercial speech, which bears a lower level of constitutional protection
than political speech, of corporations has yet to be determined.
It is to be expected that broadband access providers will, in response
to the imposition of obligations, raise constitutional challenges under the
First Amendment when it is feasible to construct them. Such challenges
have previously been raised by communications companies in response to
government requirements or prohibitions on their conduct, although the
level of judicial scrutiny for considering First Amendment claims of media
providers has varied with the underlying technology platform. For example,
telecommunications carriers successfully challenged the telephone
company-cable TV cross-ownership ban, which ultimately led to its
repeal by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.'9 In another
instance, cable companies lost their challenge to the must-carry
requirements, albeit in a close case, based on a plurality opinion, in Turner
I.6o

In several cases, including Turner II, the Court has held that
"viewpoint diversity . .. justified government action mandating that owners
of channels of mass communication open access to their facilities to certain
speakers."6 However, the traditional justifications for the varying levels of

58. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Nat'l Cable TV Ass'n, 42 F.3d
181 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that telecommunications carriers do have free speech rights
with regard to the provision of video programming over their own facilities).
59. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 302(b)(1), Pub. L. No 104-104, 110 Stat. 124
(repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)).
60. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). In considering the First
Amendment challenge in Turner II, the Court applied a lower form of judicial scrutiny,
referred to as "intermediate scrutiny." Id. at 185. The highest level of scrutiny, referred to as
"strict scrutiny," applies in cases affecting political speech, such as those related to
campaign financing. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 46465 (2007).
61. Essentiality ofAccess, supra note 1, at 261; see, e.g., Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 520
U.S. 180 (must-carry requirement imposed on cable companies); Satellite Brdcst. & Comm.
Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F. 3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001) (carry-one carry-all rule mandated by the
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act).
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judicial scrutiny among the different technology platforms are not
altogether settled. Some consider the lowest level of scrutiny applied to
broadcasting to no longer be appropriate, and the First Amendment status
of cable television providers still remains ambiguously defined. 62 The
elevation of First Amendment rights under Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, particularly in light of its discussion of media
corporations, could have a spillover effect on the Court's future review of
cases involving the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to apply among
the varying technology platforms in the context of media providers' First
Amendment claims. A heightened level of judicial scrutiny would
strengthen First Amendment challenges by technology platform providers,
thereby diminishing the government's ability to impose access mandates
for purposes of viewpoint diversity.
In Broadband Industry Practices, the FCC has proposed imposing
rules on all broadband Internet access service providers, regardless of the
technology over which such service is delivered, that reflect six
principles.64 Four of the rules are based on the general Internet policy
principles stated in the FCC's Internet Policy Statement.6 ' These four rules
each begin with the prefatory language, "[su]bject to reasonable network
management, a provider of broadband Internet access service may not,"
and continue:
1. [P]revent any of its users from sending or receiving the lawful
content of the user's choice over the Internet.
2. [P]revent any of its users from running the lawful applications or
using the lawful services of the user's choice.
3. [P]revent any of its users from connecting to and using on its
network the user's choice of lawful devices that do not harm the
network.
4. [D]eprive any of its users of the user's entitlement to competition
among network providers, application providers, service providers, and
62. For a brief discussion and references, see Essentiality of Access, supra note 1, at
272.
63. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering whether to hear an appeal
by Cablevision, which is challenging the constitutionality of the must-carry provision in the
1992 Cable Act as applied by an FCC order requiring it to carry programming of a broadcast
station in an area in which the station lacks an over-the-air audience. Cablevision is
appealing the lower court order upholding the must-carry provision in Cablevision Systems
Corps. v. Federal Communications Commission, 570 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2009), claiming that
the rationale in Turner II (and its predecessor Turner 1) no longer applies because cable
monopolies have been replaced by competition. See also John Eggerton, Supreme Court
Conferences on Must-Carry Challenge: High Court Discussing Whether to Hear
Cablevision'sChallenge to Must-CarryRules, BRDCST. & CABLE, Apr. 30, 2010.
64. Broadband Industry Practices, supra note 6.
65. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy
Statement].
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content providers.66
The other two rules are based on principles of nondiscrimination and
transparency. These rules begin with the prefatory language, "Subject to
reasonable network management, a provider of broadband Internet access
service must," and continue:
1. [T]reat lawful content, applications, and services in a
nondiscriminatory manner. 67

2. [D]isclose such information concerning network management and
other practices as is reasonably required for users and content,
application, and service providers to enjoy the protections specified in
this part.
Thus, these proposed rules impose obligations on broadband Internet
access service providers in both negative and positive terms, outlining
prohibited conduct as well as affirmative duties.
Should these rules be adopted, legal challenges by broadband Internet
access service providers are likely to follow. Given that the FCC's rules are
designed to be neutrally applied across technology platforms of the
broadband access providers, the question arises as to whether the courts
will require the rules to apply equally to all providers even if the level of
judicial scrutiny to constitutional challenges varies among the underlying
technology platforms. If the answer were "yes," then rights of the
technology platform bearing the highest level of judicial scrutiny would
thereby be imputed to all technology platforms. As a result, the elevation of
First Amendment rights could even further diminish the government's
ability to enforce the rules as to all broadband access providers.
V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION
The implications of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
also need to be understood in a broader context, which this Section
explores based on the following analyses. Part V.A explains the radical
nature of the Court's holding as revealed by the historical analysis in
Justice Stevens's opinion. Part V.B asserts that the Court's radical
departure from history under its flawed analysis in Citizens United v.
FederalElection Commission mirrors that by the FCC in its classification
of broadband Internet access service-as an information service with no
separable telecommunications service component. Section 6 then examines
the combinatorial effect of the holding in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission with the FCC's current classification of broadband
Internet access service on the government's ability to impose obligations
66. Broadband Industry Practices, supra note 6, at para. 92.
67. Id. at para. 104.
68. Id. at para. 119.

HeinOnline -- 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 605 2010-2011

606

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 63

on broadband Internet access service providers. It concludes that
continuing along and combining the trajectories of both the Court and FCC
decisions will seriously weaken the economic and free speech rights of
individuals relative to those of corporate broadband access service
providers.

A.

The Court's RadicalDeparturefrom the History ofFirst
Amendment Law

Justice Stevens's opinion is of uncommon length and depth for a
dissenting opinion. 9 It is difficult to appreciate the thoroughness and
convincing nature of Justice Stevens's analysis unless one reads his opinion
in its entirety. Nonetheless, this Section attempts to summarize, and to
capture key aspects of, Justice Stevens's critique of the majority opinion.
1.

Overview

In providing an overview of his dissent, Justice Stevens states that
"[t]he real issue in this case concerns how, not if, the appellant may finance
its electioneering.. .. All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United
[a wealthy nonprofit corporation] had a right to use the funds in its general
treasury to pay for broadcasts [of Hillary: The Movie] during the 30-day
period [before the primary election] .,,7 He asserts that
The basic premise underlying the Court's ruling is its iteration, and
constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment bars
regulatory distinctions based on a speaker's identity, including its
'identity' as a corporation.

. .

. The conceit that corporations must be

treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only
inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court's disposition of this
case.7 1
He stresses that "[i]n the context of election to public office, the
distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although
they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not
actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office."72 Yet, "[t]he
majority's approach to corporate electioneering marks a dramatic break
from our past. Congress has placed special limitations on campaign
spending by corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in

69. The opinion is ninety pages in length (as compared to fifty-seven pages for the
majority opinion). Although titularly Justice Stevens's opinion is concurring in part and
dissenting in part-Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor join in Part IV of the
majority opinion that upholds disclaimer and disclosure requirements imposed on Citizens
United-the entirety of its text is devoted to dissent.
70. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 930.
72. Id.
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1907."" Instead, Justice Stevens asserts that, in reality, in subsequent cases
the Court has accepted the "legislative judgment that the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation."74 Therefore, "[t]he Court today rejects a century of history
when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual campaign
spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin." 5 Justice Stevens then
"regret[s] the length of what follows, but the importance and novelty of the
,,76
Court's opinion require[s] a full response.
2. The Court's Motivation for Failing to Exercise Judicial
Restraint and for Conducting an Ahistorical Analysis
Justice Stevens proceeds to critique the Court's majority opinion both
procedurally and on the merits. As to procedure, he asserts that the question
of overruling Austin and part of McConnell7 was not properly before the
Court, and that the Court failed to exercise longstanding principles of
judicial restraint because it did not decide the case either on the basis of an
as-applied rather than facial constitutional challenge to § 441(b) or on
narrower grounds. On the merits, he asserts that the Court's ahistorical,
nonempirical analysis renders each of the Court's claims underlying its
holding simply wrong. For purposes of discussion here, the procedural
defects are important in terms of eliciting the Court's motivation; however,
the primary focus will be on Justice Stevens's critique on the merits.
Justice Stevens frames his critique based on historical analysis, which
he emphasizes the majority opinion fails to provide. Moreover, he asserts
that historical analysis reveals the radical nature of the Court's opinion:
First, the Court rejected the historical distinction between corporate and
individual campaign spending. Second, this rejection is based in part on
the Court's "claims that Austin and McConnell are radical outliers,
'aberration[s],' in our First Amendment tradition and our campaign finance
jurisprudence." 8 But Justice Stevens asserts that "[t]he Court has it exactly
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
209 (1982)).
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 931. I, too, regret the length of Part V.A of this Article; but to appreciate how
Citizens United is a radical departure from history, a fair representation of Justice Stevens's
analysis is required.
77. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
78. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 931-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 932-38. For the distinction between as-applied and facial constitutional
challenges, see infra note 84.
80. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 948 (quotations omitted). In McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, the Court upheld the
provisions of the BCRA that plugged the soft-money loophole under the Federal Election
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backwards. It is today's holding that is the radical departure from what had
been settled First Amendment law. To see why, it is useful to take a long
view." 82 Rather, Justice Stevens concludes, "this history helps illuminate
just how extraordinarily dissonant the decision is., 83
Reflective of the majority's ahistorical analysis, Justice Stevens
asserts that the Court's decision is not based on empirical reality.
Criticizing the Court for acting contrary to the fundamental principle of
judicial restraint, he further states "[t]he problem goes still deeper, for the
Court [declares § 441(b) facially unconstitutional] on the basis of pure
speculation." 84 "In this case, the record is not simply incomplete or
unsatisfactory; it is nonexistent."85 Moreover, Justice Stevens asserts that
"the Court supplements its merits case with a smattering of assertions."
To explain the reason for the Court's lack of judicial restraint and its
ahistorical and nonempirical analysis, Justice Stevens claims that the
majority's motivation for its decision is simply that it disagrees with the
precedent set forth in Austin. "The only thing preventing the majority from
affirming the District Court, or adopting a narrower ground that would
retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin."87 Stressing that no one has asked the
Court to overrule Austin but rather numerous groups have urged the Court
to preserve Austin, Justice Stevens asserts that "[i]n the end, the Court's
rejection of Austin and McConnell comes down to nothing more than its
disagreement with their results. . . . The only relevant thing that has

changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this Court."
Fueled by its disdain for Austin as precedent, "[a]ll of the majority's
theoretical arguments turn on a proposition with undeniable surface appeal
but little grounding in evidence or experience, that there is no such thing as
too much speech."89 As a result, Justice Stevens argues that the Court's
analysis lacks any valid basis for ignoring the distinctive features of
Campaign Act of 1971 and imposed regulation of electioneering communications.
82. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948.
83. Id. at 952.
84. Id. at 933. To declare a statute unconstitutional on its face is a more extreme
remedy than to find a statute unconstitutional as applied to a specific set of circumstances.
The former is a remedy for a facial challenge, which means that the statute is so flawed that
it is unconstitutional regardless of the circumstances of the case at hand. The latter is a
remedy for an as-applied challenge, in which a statute is found to be unconstitutional as to
the circumstances of the specific case but may be constitutional under other factual
circumstances. Given the severity of holding that a statute is facially unconstitutional, courts
usually prefer to exercise judicial restraint and rule instead on an as-applied basis, where
possible.

85. Id.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

939.
938.
941-42.
975 (quotation omitted).
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corporations and may thereby promote corporate power over individuals.
[T]he majority ... simply stipulates that 'enlightened self-government'
can arise only in the absence of regulation. . . . . In light of the
distinctive features of corporations identified in Austin, there is no
valid basis for this assumption. . . . The Court's blinkered and

aphoristic approach to the First Amendment may well promote
corporate power at the cost of the individual and collective selfexpression the Amendment was meant to serve.9 0

3.

Each of the Court's Basic Premises is Wrong

After dispensing with his procedural critique, Justice Stevens then
observes that the Court's ruling on the merits rests on three basic premises:
First, the Court claims that Austin and McConnell have "banned"
corporate speech. Second, it claims that the First Amendment
precludes regulatory distinctions based on speaker identity, including
the speaker's identity as a corporation. Third, it claims that Austin and
McConnell were radical outliers in our First Amendment tradition and
our campaign finance jurisprudence. 9'
He unequivocally states, "[e]ach of these claims is wrong,"9 2 and then he
proceeds to explain why.
As to the first premise, Justice Stevens states that the Court's
characterization [that Austin and McConnell have 'banned' corporate
speech] is highly misleading, and needs to be corrected. In fact it
already has been. Our cases have repeatedly pointed out that .

.

. the

statutes upheld in Austin and McConnell do 'not impose an absolute
ban on all forms of corporate political spending.' 93
Rather, "[t]he laws upheld in Austin and McConnell leave open many
additional avenues for corporations' political speech,"9 4 including issue
advertising and exemptions for media companies as well as corporations'
ability to raise funds through political action committees.95 "So let us be
clear: Neither Austin nor McConnell held or implied that corporations may
be silenced."96
As to the second premise-that the First Amendment precludes
regulatory distinctions based on speaker identity, including identity as a
corporation-Justice Stevens asserts "the holding in [Bellotti, upon which
the Court relies,] was far narrower than the Court implies." 97 Reviewing
prior cases upholding special restrictions on speech rights imposed on
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 977 (citation omitted).
Id. at 942.
Id.
Id. (citing Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
Id. at 943.

95. See id. at 942-44.
96. Id. at 944.
97. Id.at 945.
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specific classes of speakers, he asserts that "it is simply incorrect to suggest
that we have prohibited all legislative distinctions based on identity or
content. Not even close."98 Furthermore, "[a]s we have unanimously
observed, legislatures are entitled to decide that the special characteristics
of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation in an
electoral context." 99 Expanding on the importance of special characteristics
of corporations, Justice Stevens states:
Campaign finance distinctions based on corporate identity tend to be
less worrisome . . . because the "speakers" are not natural persons,

much less members of our political community, and the governmental
interests are of the highest order. Furthermore, when corporations, as a
class, are distinguished from noncorporations, as a class, there is a
lesser risk that regulatory distinctions will reflect invidious
discrimination or political favoritism. 00
As for media corporations in particular, "[legislatures] are likewise entitled
to regulate media corporations differently from other corporations to ensure
that the law does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting
on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy events."'o' He concludes
"[i]n short, the Court dramatically overstates its critique of identity-based
distinctions, without ever explaining why corporate identity demands the
same treatment as individual identity. Only the most wooden approach to
the First Amendment could justify the unprecedented line it seeks to

draw."l 02
As to the third premise, that Austin and McConnell are radical outliers
in First Amendment tradition and campaign finance jurisprudence, Justice
Stevens counters that it is the majority that has radically departed from
settled First Amendment law. 03
Understanding Our First Amendment Tradition Based on
Historical Analysis

4.

It is at this juncture that Justice Stevens embarks on an historical
analysis of the First Amendment. The historical analysis is labeled Our
First Amendment Tradition, which is then divided into three parts: (1)
Original Understandings, (2) Legislative and Judicial Interpretation, and
(3) Buckley and Bellotti.'" The discussion here will continue in terms of
the analysis in these three parts.

98. Id. at 946.
99. Id. at 947 (citation omitted).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Idat 947 n.50 (quotations omitted).
Id at 948.
Id
Id. at 948-61.
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In OriginalUnderstandings,the Court is faulted for

mak[ing] only a perfunctory attempt to ground its analysis in the
principles or understandings of those who drafted and ratified the
[First] Amendment. Perhaps this is because there is not a scintilla of
evidence to support the notion that anyone believed it would preclude
regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form.105
The analysis in this part continues to explain that "the Framers and
their contemporaries .

.

. held very different views about the nature of the

First Amendment right and the role of corporations in society. Those few
corporations that existed at the founding were authorized by grant of a
special legislative charter."l 06 More specifically, during that time,
"[c]orporations were created, supervised, and conceptualized as quasipublic entities, designed to serve a social function for the state.

. .

. [and]

[t]he individualized charter mode of incorporation reflected the cloud of
disfavor under which corporations labored in the early years of this
Nation."o
For these reasons, Justice Stevens concludes,
The Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be
comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare. Unlike
our colleagues, they had little trouble distinguishing corporations from
human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free
speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual
Americans that they had in mind. 08
Thus, "[g]iven that corporations were conceived of as artificial
entities and do not have the technical capacity to 'speak,' the burden of
establishing that the Framers and ratifiers understood 'the freedom of
speech' to encompass corporate speech is . . . far heavier than the majority

acknowledges."' 09 Upon review of "background practices and
understandings, it seems to me implausible that the Framers believed 'the
freedom of speech' would extend equally to all corporate speakers, much
less that it would preclude legislatures from taking limited measures to
guard against corporate capture of elections."o10 In summary, Justice
Stevens asserts, "[a]s a matter of original expectations, then, it seems
absurd to think that the First Amendment prohibits legislatures from taking
into account the corporate identity of a sponsor of electoral advocacy.""'

105. Id. at 948.
106. Id. at 948-49 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 949 (quotations omitted). "General incorporation statutes, and widespread
acceptance of business corporations as socially useful actors, did not emerge until the
1800's." Id (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 949-50 (citation omitted).

109. Id. at 950 n.55.
110. Id.at950.
111. Id. at951.
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As for media corporations, the Free Press Clause "suggests why one type of
corporation, those that are part of the press, might be able to claim special
First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of 'identity'-based
distinctions might be permissible after all.""12 Therefore, "nothing in our
constitutional history dictates today's outcome. To the contrary, this history
helps illuminate just how extraordinarily dissonant the decision is." 13
In Legislative and JudicialInterpretation,Justice Stevens states that,

A century of more recent history puts to rest any notion that today's
ruling is faithful to our First Amendment tradition. At the federal level,
the express distinction between corporate and individual political
spending on elections stretches back to 1907, when Congress passed
the Tillman Act banning all corporate contributions to candidates.1 4
[T]he Act was primarily driven by two pressing concerns: first, the
enormous power corporations had come to wield in federal elections,
with the accompanying threat of both actual corruption and a public
perception of corruption; and second, a respect for the interest of
shareholders and members in preventing the use of their money to
support candidates they opposed." 5
In the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, "Congress extended the prohibition
on corporate support of candidates to cover not only direct contributions,
but independent expenditures as well."ll 6
By the time Congress passed FECA [Federal Election Campaign Act]
in 1971, the bar on corporate contributions and expenditures had
become such an accepted part of federal campaign finance regulation
that when a large number of plaintiffs, including several nonprofit
corporations, challenged virtually every aspect of the Act in Buckley,
no one even bothered to argue that the bar as such was
unconstitutional.'' 7
In Austin, the Court
noted that corporations have special advantages-such as limited
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation
and distribution of assets-that allow them to spend prodigious general
treasury sums on campaign messages that have "little or no
correlation" with the beliefs held by actual persons." 8
"In the 20 years since Austin, [the Court has] reaffirmed its holding
and rationale a number of times.""' Finally, in McConnell "[the Court has]
repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at 'the corrosive and distorting
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id at 952 n.57.
Id. at 952.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id at 953 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 954 (citation omitted).
Id. at 956 (quotations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
correlation to the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no
20
ideas.,,
political
corporation's
the
for
support
public's
In the part of his opinion subtitled Buckley and Bellotti, Justice
Stevens argues that the majority uses selected passages from two cases,
Buckley v. Valeol2 ' and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,12 2 to
dismiss Austin as "a significant departure from ancient First Amendment
principles." 1 23 He discusses how the Court takes a phrase in Buckley that
"cannot bear the weight that our colleagues have placed on it"l2 4 in order to
create the false impression of conflict with Austin.125 Furthermore, he
asserts that the Court misrepresents the ruling in Austin:
The majority suggests that Austin rests on the foreign concept of
speech equalization, but we made it clear in Austin (as in several cases
before and since) that a restriction on the way corporations spend their
money is no mere exercise in disfavoring the voice of some elements
of society in preference to others. Indeed, we expressly ruled that the
compelling interest supporting Michigan's statute was not one of "
'equaliz[ing] the relative influence of speakers on elections,"' [sic] but
rather the need to confront the distinctive corrupting potential of
corporate electoral advocacy financed by general treasury dollars.126
Justice Stevens also explains why "[t]he Court's reliance [on Bellotti] is
odd. The only thing about Bellotti that could not be clearer is that it
declined to adopt the majority's position." 27 In this regard, Justice Stevens
is referring to the Court's assertion "that Bellotti's holding forbade
distinctions between corporate and individual expenditures like the one at
issue here." 2 8 On the contrary, "Bellotti . . . did not touch the question
presented in Austin and McConnell, and the opinion squarely disavowed
the proposition for which the majority cites it.', 29 Justice Stevens concludes
"Austin and McConnell, then, sit perfectly well with Bellotti."o30 "In sum,
over the course of the past century Congress has demonstrated a recurrent

120. Id. at 957 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003)
(quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))).
121. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
122. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
123. Citzens United, 130 S. Ct. at 957 (quoting majority opinion) (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 958. The phrase is: "The concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
125. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958.
126. Id. (citations omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. (citation omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 960.
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need to regulate corporate participation in candidate elections."' '
5.

The Court's Failure to Appreciate Special Concerns Raised by
Corporations

In the next section of his opinion, Justice Stevens "come[s] at last to
the interests that are at stake. The majority recognizes that Austin and
McConnell may be defended on anticorruption, antidistortion, and
shareholder protection rationales."1 32 He concludes that the Court "badly
errs both in explaining the nature of these rationales, which overlap and
complement each other, and in applying them to the case at hand." 33 For
purposes of this Article, Justice Stevens's discussion of important
differences between corporations and human beings that underlie these
rationales for justifying government regulation is most relevant and will be
outlined here.
With regard to the anticorruption interest, the majority claims that
"the only sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption is one that is limited to quidpro
quo corruption."1 34 Justice Stevens argues, "the majority cannot be right ...
. It disregards our constitutional history and the fundamental demands of a
democratic society."135 Justice Stevens contends that "[c]orruption operates
along a spectrum, and the majority's apparent belief that quid pro quo
arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences
does not accord with the theory or reality of politics." 136 After reviewing
factual findings in earlier cases, Justice Stevens concludes that "[u]nlike the
majority's myopic focus on quid pro quo scenarios,

.

.

.

[a] broader

understanding of corruption has deep roots in the Nation's history."l37
Moreover, "[e]ven in the cases that have construed the anticorruption
interest most narrowly, [the Court has] never suggested that such quid pro
quo [political] debts must take the form of outright vote buying or bribes...
. Congress may 'legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance
of improper influence is also critical."" 3 ' Thus, Justice Stevens concludes
that the Court "misreads the facts and draws the wrong conclusions" in
dismissing the evidence in the record in Buckley.139 Furthermore,

131. Id

132. Id. at 961.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963 (citation omitted).
Id. at 964 (citation omitted).
Id. at 966.
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"prophylactic measures [may be] required to guard against corruption." 40
With regard to the antidistortion rationale, Justice Stevens states
"[the majority fails to appreciate that Austin's antidistortion rationale is
itself an anticorruption rationale .

.

. tied to the special concerns raised by

corporations."'41 "The fact that corporations are different from human
beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the majority opinion
almost completely elides it." 42 The resources in the general treasury of a
business corporation do not indicate the popular support for the
corporation's political ideas, but "reflect the economically motivated
decisions of investors and customers." 4 3 "It might also be added that
corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no
desires. . . . [T]hey are not themselves members of 'We the People' by

whom and for whom our Constitution was established."'" Justice Stevens
also stresses that "[c]orporate speech . . . is derivative speech, speech by

proxy;" 4 5 and that "[ift is an interesting question 'who' is even speaking
when a business corporation places an advertisement that endorses or
attacks a particular candidate." 46
Justice Stevens then discusses the significance of corporations'
unique structure for amassing wealth relative to human beings.
Austin recognized that there are substantial reasons why a legislature
might conclude that unregulated general treasury expenditures will
give corporations 'unfai[r] influence' in the electoral process, . . . [as]

[t]he legal structure of corporations allows them to amass and deploy
financial resources on a scale few natural persons can match.147
"The majority's unwillingness to distinguish between corporations
and humans similarly blinds it to the possibility that corporations' 'war
chests' and their special 'advantages' in the legal realm .

into special advantages in the market for legislation."

.

. may translate

48

Consequently,

"[c]orporations . . . are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their

owners, not simply because they have a lot of money but because of their
legal and organizational structure." 49
All of the majority's theoretical arguments turn on a proposition with
undeniable surface appeal but little grounding in evidence or
experience, 'that there is no such thing as too much speech.'. . . In the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 968 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 970 (citation omitted).
Id. at 971.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id. at 972.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 975 (citation omitted).
Id.
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real world, we have seen, corporate domination of the airwaves prior to
an election may decrease the average listener's exposure to relevant
viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens' willingness and capacity to
participate in the democratic process." 0
Justice Stevens also emphasizes the Court's failure to acknowledge
that competing First Amendment interests are involved between
corporations and human beings:
The majority seems oblivious to the simple truth that laws such as [§
441(b)] do not merely pit the anticorruption interest against the First
Amendment, but also pit competing First Amendment values against
each other. There are, to be sure, serious concerns with any effort to
balance the First Amendment rights of speakers against the First
Amendment rights of listeners. But when the speakers in question are
not real people and when the appeal to "First Amendment principles"
depends almost entirely on the listeners' perspective .

.

. it becomes

necessary to consider how listeners will actually be affected.' 5 '
Therefore, although difficult, a balancing of interests is required.
As for media corporations, Justice Stevens observes
In critiquing Austin's antidistortion rationale and campaign finance
regulation more generally, our colleagues place tremendous weight on
the example of media corporations. . . . Our colleagues have raised

some interesting and difficult questions about Congress's authority to
regulate electioneering by the press, and about how to define what
constitutes the press. But that is not the case before us.152
Finally, Justice Stevens considers it "perfectly understandable if [the
majority] feared that a campaign finance regulation such as [§ 441(b)] may
be counterproductive or self-interested, and therefore attended carefully to
the choices the Legislature has made."' 5 3 However, he emphasizes that:
[T]he majority does not bother to consider such practical matters, or
even to consult a record; it simply stipulates that "enlightened selfgovernment" can arise only in the absence of regulation.

. .

. In light of

the distinctive features of corporations identified in Austin, there is no
valid basis for this assumption. The marketplace of ideas is not actually
a place where items--or laws-are meant to be bought and sold, and
when we move from the realm of economics to the realm of corporate
electioneering, there may be no "reason to think the market ordering is
intrinsically good at all." . . . The Court's approach to the First

Amendment may well promote corporate power at the cost of the
individual and collective self-expression the Amendment was meant to
serve.154
Thus, the Court's approach is not only nonempirical and impractical, but

150. Id. at 975-76 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 976 (citation omitted).
152. Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 976-77.
154. Id. at 977 (citations omitted).
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also invalid because it fails to address the distinctive features of
corporations.
As to the third rationale, shareholder protection, Justice Stevens
emphasizes that the protection of dissenting shareholders and union
members has a long history in campaign finance reform, and "[i]t provided
a central motivation for the Tillman Act in 1907."1' Furthermore, "[t]he
shareholder protection rationale . .. bolsters the conclusion that restrictions
on corporate electioneering can serve both speakers' and listeners'
interests, as well as the anticorruption interest."' 5 6
Summary of the Court's Radical Departure from History

6.

Justice Stevens concludes his opinion, summarizing the various ways
in which the Court's opinion is a radical departure from history. The
precision of Justice Stevens's articulation deserves quotation at length:
Today's decision is backwards in many senses. It elevates the
majority's agenda over the litigants' submissions, facial attacks over
as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories over narrow statutory
grounds, individual dissenting opinions over precedential holdings,
assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over
reality. Our colleagues have arrived at the conclusion that Austin must
be overruled and that [§ 441(b)] is facially unconstitutional only after
mischaracterizing both the reach and rationale of those authorities, and
after bypassing or ignoring rules of judicial restraint used to cabin the
Court's lawmaking power. Their conclusion that the societal interest in
avoiding corruption does not provide an adequate justification for
regulating corporate expenditures on candidate elections relies on an
incorrect description of that interest, along with a failure to
acknowledge the relevance of established facts and the considered
judgments of state and federal legislatures over many decades. . . . At
bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of
the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent
corporations from undermining self-government since the founding,
and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of
corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a
57
strange time to repudiate that common sense.

B.

Mirroringthe FCC's RadicalDeparturefrom the History of
Common Carriage

The flawed analysis in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission and its implications for establishing baseline obligations on
broadband Internet access service providers mirrors that of the FCC's
reclassification of broadband Internet access service as an information
155. Id.
156. Id. at 979.
157. Id.
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service with no separable telecommunications service component. Both
constitute radical departures from historical jurisprudence and eliminate
policy choices that could be invoked to protect the interests of individuals
from corporate power, thus, in effect, favoring the rights of corporations
over individuals. This Section provides an overview of prior research
explaining how the elimination of common carriage obligations to the
provision of the telecommunications component of information services is
the result of inappropriate ahistorical analysis and is a radical departure of
deregulatory policies from those of transportation common carriers.
1.

Historical Roots of Misunderstanding the Law of Common
Carriage for Telecommunications

A critical component of my research has been devoted to correcting
misconceptions and mischaracterizations of the law of common carriage
that unfortunately misinform debates of important telecommunications
policies. This research began with analysis of the limited liability practices
of telecommunications carriers in my Ph.D. dissertation, which was later
revised and published in my book, The Crisis in Telecommunications
CarrierLiability.'"8 During the course of this research, I discovered that
many judicial and regulatory decisions (both state and federal) as well as
the secondary academic literature related to telephony contained factual
errors related to the history of the law of common carriage. These errors
had formed the basis for analytical errors in the analyses and conclusions of
judicial and regulatory agency decisions concerning the liability regime of
telecommunications carriers, and in the associated academic literature
discussing them. My book was devoted to revealing and correcting these
errors, explaining how the errors likely arose and persisted, and applying a
factually accurate understanding of the law of common carriage to an
economic analysis of what liability rules should apply in a detariffed
telecommunications environment.
As I expanded the scope of my research, I discovered that the factual
and analytical errors related to common carriage had continued to diffuse
and were now misinforming debates of other deregulatory
telecommunications policies, particularly those related to broadband. In
order to apply a historically accurate understanding of common carriage
and its relationship to other bodies of law-such as public utilities and
antitrust-to issues of broadband access, I developed the organizing
principle "essentiality of access." As discussed in Section II, this typology
clarifies that different access problems led to the evolution of distinctive
158. BARBARA A. CHERRY, THE CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER LIABILITY:
HISTORICAL REGULATORY FLAWS AND RECOMMENDED REFORM (1999) [hereinafter THE
CRISIS IN LIABILITY].
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legal principles; furthermore, the different legal principles affect different
types of legal rights, such as economic rights and free speech rights, of the
access recipients and access providers. Awareness of the types of rights
that are affected by government intervention is necessary for determining
how to address conflicts among them when simultaneously pursuing
multiple access objectives, particularly when such conflicts affect
constitutional rights of individuals as opposed to corporations.
Applying an "essentiality of access" analysis to the network neutrality
debate shows that a diversity of alleged goals, problems, and remedies
affecting multiple types of access problems are involved.' 59 These, in turn,
lead to juxtaposition of differing legal principles-one of which is common
carriage-and affect differing types of rights of access recipients and
access providers. Unfortunately, different access problems and associated
legal principles have become conflated in the discourse affecting
broadband access services, driven in large part from mischaracterizations
of common carriage. Importantly, these misconceptions and
mischaracterizations are created by factual and analytical errors arising
from analyses that either totally ignore or improperly frame temporal
dimensions of the evolution of the law of common carriage.Because the
law of common carriage-as well as its relationship to other legal
principles that evolved to address different types of access problems-has
been mischaracterized, factual and analytical errors have infiltrated and
misguided the FCC's consideration of appropriate obligations for
broadband Internet access service providers and is continuing to mislead
debate regarding issues falling under the rubric of network neutrality.
2.

The Real History of the Law of Common Carriage

With its origins under the English common law, "[c]ommon carriers,
merely by virtue of their status as public employments, or public callings,
bore unique obligations under tort law to serve upon reasonable request
without discrimination, to charge just and reasonable prices, and to exercise
their calling with adequate care, skill and honesty." 60 A common carrier
bore its obligations merely on the basis of its status as a public
employment, independent of any requirement or finding of monopoly or
marketpower.
The independence of tort obligations from market structure is best
appreciated by understanding that tort obligations are relational norms:
Tort law is first and foremost a law of responsibilities and redress. It
identifies what we will call "loci of responsibility." These loci consist
159. For application of "essentiality of access" to network neutrality, see Misusing
Network Neutrality,supra note 4, at 44.
160. MaintainingCriticalLegal Rules, supra note 7, at 962.
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of spheres of interaction that come with, and are defined (in part) by
relational duties: obligations that are owed by one person to others
when interacting with those others in certain contexts and in certain
ways. Beneficiaries of this special class of duties enjoy a concomitant
privilege or power; they are entitled to seek legal redress if injured by
the breach of one of these duties.''
"The duty-imposing norms of tort law are relational norms: they enjoin
persons from acting toward certain other persons in certain ways."l62 "Torts
are legal wrongs for which courts provide victims a right of civil
recourse-aright to sue for a remedy." 6 3
Thus, the tort obligations of common carriers are legally enforceable,
relational norms. Importantly, common carriers bear these obligations
merely based on the existence of their economic relationship with
customers, independent of any requirement or finding of monopoly or
market power. Moreover, these duties require common carriers not to
interfere with customers' interests, "notwithstanding the liberty restriction
inherent in such a duty imposition."'
Some confuse common carriers with public utilities.16 5 They are not
synonymous, although some entities-such as telecommunications
carriers-are both common carriers and public utilities:
The common law of public utilities subsequently evolved in the United
States during the nineteenth century, incorporating the tort obligations
of common carriers to which was added an affirmative duty to extend
facilities to provide service with a corresponding barrier to exit. To
enable public utilities to remain financially viable while satisfying
these additional obligations, they were protected from competitive
entry typically through monopoly franchises. 166
Historically, public utilities received certain privileges pursuant to a
contractual relationship with government in exchange for which they bore
certain obligations. These privileges included protection from market entry,
often through monopoly franchises. 167 It is at this juncture that the
existence of monopoly became relevant to the regulatory obligations
161. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64
MD. L. REv. 364, 368 (2005).
162. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REv.
917, 960 (2010) (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 985 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 937 (footnote omitted).
165. For a discussion of the distinction between common carriers and public utilities, see
THE CRISIS INLIABILITY, supra note 158, at 55-56.
166. MaintainingCriticalLegal Rules, supra note 7, at 962 (footnote omitted).
167. Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service
Companies: Part II, 11 COLuM. L. REv. 616, 616-17; Sallyanne Payton, The Duty of a
Public Utility to Serve in the Presence ofNew Competition, in APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES INPUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 121, 138 (Werner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies eds.,
1981).
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imposed on public utilities, some of which were also common carriers.
Unfortunately, the dual classification of telephone companies, now
telecommunications carriers, as both common carriers and public utilities
has led to factually inaccurate and inappropriate association between
common carriage obligations and monopoly or market power. This
analytical error has resulted in policy recommendations, such as the
assertion that common carriage obligations are no longer necessary in a
competitive market and that any problems can be adequately addressed
under antitrust law, which have infiltrated the network neutrality debate.168
It was the rise of corporate power that led to the enactment of two
important federal statutory regimes: an industry-specific regime for
common carriers and a general business regime of antitrust law.'6 9 By the
late nineteenth century, corporations were more easily established given the
passage of state general incorporation statutes, and their economic
corporate power had risen dramatically during the Industrial Revolution.17 0
Given that "[r]ailroads are the arteries through which flows the life-blood
of the world's commerce," 71 Congress's attention was directed first to
railroad corporations.
A Senate Select Committee on Interstate Commerce, often referred to
as the Cullom Committee (named after Senator Cullom), was established to
address the "railroad problem." 72 The important question of how to
address the growth and influence of corporate power, both as a general
matter and to railroads in particular, was the primary concern of this
committee, as stated in the Cullom Report of 1886.173
[N]o general question of governmentalpolicy occupies at this time so
prominent a place in the thoughts of the people as that of controlling
the steady growth and extending influence of corporatepower and of
regulatingits relations to the public; and as no corporations are more
conspicuously before the public eye, and as there are none whose
operations so directly affect every citizen in the daily pursuit of his
business or avocation as the corporations engaged in transportation,

168. Misusing Network Neutrality,supra note 4, at 500-03.
169. See infra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
170. General incorporation statutes were enacted as early as 1811 and became more
widespread after 1820. See Andrew L. Creighton, The Emergence of Incorporation as a
Legal Form for Organizations 52 (July 1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University) (on file with Author). For a discussion of the rise of large-scale businesses as
corporations during the nineteenth century, see Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What
CorporateLaw Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L.

REv. 387; James Willard Hurst, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970).
171. S. REP. No. 49-46, at 4 (1886) [hereinafter CULLOM
172. Id. at 1.
173. Id.

BusINESS CORPORATION IN THE
REPORT).
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they naturally receive the most consideration in this connection.'

[Vol. 63
74

In the Cullom Report, the Cullom Committee then describes initial
U.S. policy towards the railroads and why it must change. "It was a matter
of necessity in a new country with undeveloped resources and struggling
with other burdens which fully taxed its capacity that the work of railroad
construction should be left to private enterprise."175 "It by no means
follows, however, that regulation is not now needed, or that the policy
which was adopted in the beginning as a matter of necessity, and has
served a useful purpose, is still the one best adapted to the present
requirements of the country and should be permanently continued."' 76
Based on hearings and evidence presented to the Cullom Committee,
the Cullom Report then discusses the results of railroad building. It
describes the first railroads as "modest ventures" serving local
constituencies, the subsequent construction of through lines and long
distance travel, continuous consolidations of railroads, and their expansion
throughout the nation.17 7 "The policy which has been pursued has given us
the most efficient railway service and the lowest rates known in the world;
but its recognized benefits have been attained at the cost of the most
unwarranted discriminations."
The Cullom Report acknowledges that
upon no public question are the people so nearly unanimous as upon
the proposition that Congress should undertake in some way the
regulation of interstate commerce. . . . This demand is occasioned by

the existence of acknowledged evils incident to and growing out of the
complicated business of transportation as now conducted."19 "The
public interest demands regulation of the business of transportation
because, in the absence of such regulation, the carrier is practically and
actually the sole and final arbiter upon all disputed questions that arise
between [customer] and carrier as to whether rates are reasonable or
unjust discrimination has been practiced.'s
The railroads' arguments against regulation are then discussed.
Railroads argued
that arbitrary or oppressive rates cannot be maintained; that they are
adjusted and sufficiently regulated by competition . . . ; that such
discriminations as exist are for the most part unavoidable; that the

owners and managers of the property are the best judges of the
conditions and circumstances that affect the cost of transportation and
should determine the compensation they are entitled to receive; and
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
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that, in any event, the common law affords the shipper [i.e. customer]
an adequate remedy and protection against abuse or any infringement
of his rights.' 8 1
The Cullom Report then discusses its conclusions, which reject the
railroads' arguments, and are briefly quoted here. "[T]he facts [do not]
warrant the claim that competition and self-interest can be relied upon to
secure the shipper against abuse and unjust discrimination, or that he has an
available and satisfactory remedy at common law." 8 2 "National legislation
is necessary to remedy the evils complained of, because the operations of
the transportation system are, for the most part, beyond the jurisdiction of
the States .

. .

. National supervision would supplement, give direction to,

and render effective State supervision." 83 "National legislation is also
necessary, because the business of transportation is essentially of a nature
which requires that uniform system and method of regulation which the
national authority can alone prescribe." 84 "The failure of Congress to act is
an excuse for the attempts made by the railroads to regulate the commerce
of the country in their own way and in their own interests by whatever
combinations and methods they are able to put into operation.', 8 "In the
absence of national legislation, . . . [t]he final outcome of continued

consolidations would be the creation of an organization more powerful than
the Government itself and perhaps beyond its control." 86 Finally, "[t]hat a
satisfactory solution of the problem can ever be secured without the aid of
wise legislation the committee does not believe."
Based on the recommendations in the Cullom Report, Congress
enacted the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) of 1887.18' The ICA codified
the relational norms of common law common carriage, but significantly
altered the means of their enforcement. 89 It created a federal regulatory
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), with authority to
oversee enforcement of the provisions of the ICA.1 90 The railroad carriers
were required to file publicly available tariffs with the ICC in order to
provide greater uniformity of rates, terms and conditions of service, and to
mitigate the scope of permissible discrimination.' 9 ' It was unlawful for
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.

185. Id.
186. Id.

187. Id. at 180.
188. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
189. Id. §§ 1-3.
190. Id. § 11.
191. Id. § 6.
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railroad carriers to deviate from their tariffs, which effectively relieved
customers of the burden of proof they had borne under the common law
regarding carriers' alleged violations of their common carrier
obligations. 19 2 The ICC had complaint jurisdiction, rulemaking powers, and
the authority to initiate investigations.193 The ICA institutionalized a
regulatory framework that inserted a new type of governmental entity to
mediate the economic relationship between a corporate, critical
infrastructure provider and the public. The ICA was later amended in 1910
by the Mann-Elkins Act to place telegraph and telephone companies under
ICC jurisdiction, and it provided the basis for the statutory framework of
Title II (common carriage) of the Communications Act of 1934 when
federal jurisdiction over telegraph and telephone companies was transferred
to the newly created FCC.194
The first federal antitrust statute, the Sherman Act, was enacted three
years after the ICA in 1890.'19 The Sherman Act applied to general
businesses, including common carriers. Over time, the essential facilities
doctrine-prohibiting a monopolist from refusing to deal with competitors
with regard to an essential facility-evolved through judicial interpretation
of the Sherman Act. 196 The purpose of the essential facilities doctrine is to
address the problem of access to an essential facility among competitors;
this is different from the purpose of common carriage, which addresses the
economic relationship between a carrier and enduser customer in the retail
market.
3.

The FCC's Radical Departure from Both the Ancient History of
Common Carriage and the Recent Historical Classification of
the Telecommunications Component of Information Services
The accessibility of the Internet to the general public began with dialup access to the facilities of the public switched telecommunications
192. Id.
193. Id. §§ 13, 17.
194. See Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, Title II: The Common Carrier
Provisions-A Product of Evolutionary Development, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 25, 25 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989) (citation omitted)
("Title II is principally an adaptation to the communications industry of a statutory scheme
initially developed for railroads in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, or Cullom Act, and
its subsequent legislative refinements and judicial interpretation.").
195. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
196. The essential facilities doctrine is considered to have originated in United States v.
Terminal RailroadAss'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). Other cases seen as supporting
the essential facilities doctrine include Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945),
and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not explicitly invoked the essential facilities doctrine and found "no
need either to recognize it or to repudiate it" in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410-11 (2004).
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network (PSTN).' 97 The PSTN itself is subject to common carriage
regulation under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. Thus, the
evolution of the Internet we experience today is dependent, in part, on its
historical interconnection and interoperability with a preexisting common

carriage PSTN.
provision via
require
to customers
services
Enhanced
telecommunications, as the FCC has long recognized. Pursuant to the
Computer Inquiry proceedings, the FCC determined that enhanced services
provided via narrowband telecommunications had a separable
telecommunications service component" In these proceedings, the FCC
imposed Title II common carriage obligations on the telecommunications
service component, referred to as basic service, to address potential
anticompetitive conduct by telecommunications carriers with regard to
competitors in an ancillary market, consisting of unaffiliated enhanced
service providers (ESPs) or Internet service providers (ISPs), for whom
access to the carrier's underlying telecommunications facilities was
deemed essential. 199 In this way, there was a convergence of concerns with
discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct, to which application of
common carrier obligations by FCC rule was deemed a solution; however,
relational norms on
carriage
application of common
the
telecommunications carriers in serving unaffiliated ESPs arose from a
different economic relationship than that between carriers and (end user)
customers under the common law. Thus, for the provision of information
(or enhanced) services via narrowband telecommunications, both the
enduser customer and unaffiliated ISPs obtained the telecommunications
service component through a common carriage relationship with the
underlying common carrier.
After enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, this
framework was subsequently applied to carriers' provision of DSL
(broadband) services. Although, under the 1996 Act, the relevant
197. The PSTN is the public telephone network providing circuit switching between
public users. This system is based on carrying analog voice data over dedicated circuits for
the duration of the call. In contrast to PSTN, newer Internet telephony networks based on
digital technology use packet switching. Under packet switching, the information travels in
individual network packets that are reassembled at the destination.
198. In the Computer Inquiry proceedings, the FCC created a dichotomy between basic
services and enhanced services. Basic service is the offering of transmission capability over
a communications path and is required to be provided as a common carriage service.
Enhanced service is offered over common carrier transmission facilities and employs
computer processing applications that act on the subscriber's transmitted information, but is
not required to be offered as a common carriage service. For a discussion of the Computer
Inquiry proceedings, see Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications
Commission's ComputerInquiries, 55 FED. CoMM. L.J. 167 (2003).
199. See id. at 177-81, 183-89.
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terminology is information service rather than enhanced service.2 00 DSL
service was classified as a Title II common carriage service available to
end users, and the telecommunications component was available on a
common carriage basis to unaffiliated information service providers per
201
FCC rule to prevent anticompetitive conduct by the carrier.
The existence of an alternative network platform, the cable systemwhich historically has not been common carriage-to provide Internet
access to the general public triggered the issue as to what obligations the
cable system providers may have both to end users and to ISPs. Beginning
with cable modem access in its Cable Declaratory Ruling2 02 and then
following with DSL access in its Wireline Broadband Order,20 3 the FCC
reversed course and classified broadband Internet access service as an
information service without a separable telecommunications component. In
so doing, the FCC placed broadband access service on a different legal
trajectory by eliminating provision of telecommunications on a common
carriagebasis to both end user customers and ISPs. With regard to end
user customers, the entity providing the underlying telecommunications is
no longer subject to the longstanding legally enforceable norms of common
law common carriage that had been codified in the Communications Act of
1934.204 To the extent that the FCC had extended these norms to
unaffiliated ISPs under the Computer Inquiry cases, the entity providing the
underlying telecommunications is also now permitted to violate those
norms in its relationship with competitors in the wholesale market. This is
why norms are being established under the rubric of network neutrality, as
exemplified by the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and further revisions
proposed in BroadbandIndustry Practices.To reinstate the recognition of
information service as containing a separable telecommunications
component provided under common carriage is at the core of assertions by
advocates that the FCC should reclassify broadband Internet access
services as Title II common carriage in light of the court's decision in
Comcast Corp. v. FederalCommunications Commission.2 05
In the context of the recent financial crisis, Paul Krugman, a Nobel

200. Id. at 191-92.
201. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
F.C.C.R. 24011, paras. 36-37 (1998) (classifying DSL as a telecommunications service).
202. Cable Declaratory Ruling, supra note 14, at para. 7.
203. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 14, at para 5.
204. The common law obligations of common carriers to provide service upon
reasonable request, without unreasonable discrimination and at a just and reasonable price,
are expressed in Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 201-02, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-02 (1994)).
205. 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Laureate in Economics, asserts that the era of U.S. stability ended with "the
rise of 'shadow banking': institutions that carried out banking functions but
operated without a safety net and with minimal regulation."206 Due in part
to banking deregulation since 1980, "institutions and practices [of shadow
banks] . . . recreated the risks of old-fashioned banking but weren't covered

either by guarantees or by regulation. The result, by 2007, was a financial
system as vulnerable to severe crisis as the system of 1930. And the crisis
came." 207
The FCC's elimination of common carriage access to
telecommunications for both end user customers and unaffiliated ISPs has
created broadband "shadow
common carriers."
The entities
(telecommunications carriers and cable companies) providing the
underlying telecommunications by which information services are
conveyed are performing the common carrier functions, but with minimal
regulation. They do not bear responsibility for violating the longstanding
relational norms of common carriers.
In order to grasp the significance of eliminating these relational norms
of common carriage to telecommunications provided over broadband
networks, and thereby creating shadow common carriers, one is required to
understand "the importance of common law principles of common carriage
and public utility law-which include imposition of ex ante requirements
on providers in the retail market-in generating the desired emergent
properties of widely available, affordable and reliable transportation and
telecommunications infrastructures." 208 It is also necessary to recognize the
temporal sequencing of the industry-specific, common carriage regime and
the general business regime of antitrust and consumer protection law to
appreciate the inadequacy of relying solely on the latter to develop and
sustain the desired broadband infrastructures.20 9
Two of my recent publications are dedicated to these tasks:
Maintaining Critical Legal Rules and Consumer Sovereignty.21 0 Some
parties mistakenly assert that network neutrality rules are not necessary
because competition is sufficient to protect against abuses of discrimination
and that any remaining problems should be addressed under antitrust
law. 2 11 As explained in both of these publications, a fundamental error
embedded in such claims is a failure to appreciate that the industry-specific
206. Paul Krugman, FinancialReform 101, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2010, at A23.
207. Dealbook, Krugman: Punks and Plutocrats,N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), available
(last
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/krugman-punks-and-plutocrats
at
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
208. MaintainingCriticalLegal Rules, supra note 7, at 950.
209. See, e.g., id. at 956-967.
210. Id.; Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 7.
211. See, e.g., Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 7, at 11.
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legal regimes of common carriage and public utilities largely predate the
legal regime for general businesses, consisting of antitrust and consumer
protection laws.
Recognition of this temporal sequence is critical, as the statutory
general business regime evolved as an adjunct to the industry-specific
statutory regimes. As a result, in numerous cases and circumstances the
general business regime has been preempted or superseded by the
industry-specific regimes, and, for such situations, further evolution of
the general business regime thereby addressed issues not covered by
the traditional industry-specific regimes. . . [U]nder deregulatory
policies . . . it is unclear whether the general business regime will

adequately address the situations or circumstances that had previously
been addressed by the traditional industry-specific regimes.2
The radical nature of the FCC's elimination of the relational norms of
common carriage to telecommunications provided over broadband
networks is also evident from a historical comparison with transportation
common carriers. "In the United States, the evolution of the legal
regulatory regimes for the telecommunications sector is in many ways
following a trajectory breathtakingly similar to that already traversed by the
transportation sector." 2 13 As previously discussed, both telecommunications
and transportation carriers made the same transition from a common law to
federal statutory regime of common carriage. More recently, the statutory
regimes have been further evolving under federal deregulatory policiesfirst for transportation carriers and later for telecommunications carriers. In
many ways, the deregulatory policy trajectories for both transportation and
telecommunications carriers have had similar characteristics: variance in
the manner of enforcing common carriage obligations; redesign of, and
sustainability problems with, universal service (public utility-type)
programs; conflicting court opinions as to the applicability of the filed rate
doctrine after detariffing; and confusion regarding the scope of federal
preemption of state causes of action, particularly related to consumer
protection laws.214
"There is, however, a major divergence in the evolutionary
trajectories of the legal regimes for the transportation and
telecommunications sectors. Recent FCC policy decisions affecting
broadband access services have eliminated common carriage in both the
wholesale or retail markets, also rendering public utility obligations
inapplicable."2 15 On the other hand, the deregulatory transportation statutes
have not removed such carriers (e.g. railroads, airlines) from their common
212. MaintainingCriticalLegal Rules, supra note 7, at 961.
213. Barbara A. Cherry, Back to the Future: How TransportationDeregulatoryPolicies
ForeshadowEvolution of CommunicationsPolicies, 24 INFo. Soc'Y 273, 274 (2008).
214. See id. at 285-87.
215. Id. at 288 (citations omitted).
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carriage status.216 They are still common carriers, but the methods of
enforcing the relational norms of common carriage obligations have been
further modified-this time to embrace policies that prefer to place greater
reliance on competitive market forces. 2 17 Thus, "[e]xperience under
deregulatory transportation policies . . . reveals the radical nature of this
broadband policy. . . . [F]or this very reason, we must look beyond

experience under deregulatory transportation policies to consider the
consequences of this unique policy trajectory for broadband." 2 18
4. Extending or Reversing the FCC's Radical Policy Trajectory
Under Network Neutrality
The decision in Comcast Corp. v. Federal Communications
Commission presents an opportunity for the FCC to reconsider its radical
policy trajectory. However, through continual misrepresentation of
common carriage, opponents of network neutrality are encouraging the
FCC to not reclassify the telecommunications component of information
services, much less information services overall, as a common carriage
service. The failure to understand that common carriage obligations are
legally enforceable, relational norms independent of industry market
structure has led to misframing of inquiry by many parties in Broadband
Industry Practicesas to how the FCC should embark in determining what
obligations should be borne by providers of broadband access. 2 19
Some opponents of network neutrality assert that antitrust principles
are sufficient to substitute for the functions that common carriage and
public utility obligations have served in providing access to enduser
customers. For example, a filing by 22 economists asserts that the FCC
should not adopt rules but follow a case-by-case approach to assess the
lawfulness of specific conduct by "apply[ing] existing, generally agreedupon standards ... such as ... the pro-competition, proconsumer doctrines

that have developed under the Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes."220
As previously discussed, such assertions are inconsistent with historical
reasons for creating the federal statutory regime of common carriage in
order to more effectively enforce the relational norms of common carriage,
and they also fail to appreciate the significance of the temporal sequencing
of the common carriage and antitrust laws as discussed in Consumer
Sovereignty.
216. See id. at 279-81.
217. Id. at 279.
218. Id. at 288.
219. See, e.g., Reply Comment, Net Neutrality Regulation: The Economic Evidence,
Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, FCC WC Docket No. 07-52
(rel. Apr. 9, 2010) (filing of 22 economists) [hereinafter Economists'Letter].
220. Id. at 27.

HeinOnline -- 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 629 2010-2011

630

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

Even more problematic is opponents' argument that common carriage
obligations should be imposed only upon a finding of monopoly or market
failure. This argument both ignores and misunderstands the longrecognized "[r]elational directives . . . [to] enjoin ...

[common carriers] to

treat or to refrain from treating other persons in a particular way." 22 1 The
tort obligations of common carriage, which include the relational norm of
no unreasonable discrimination, are imposed independent of the carrier's
market power or the industry's market structure. Unfortunately, as a
general matter, the law and economics perspective "fails to capture the
notion of right" 22 2 or to understand that "[t]ort law is not just a system for
the selective imposition of liability in ways that will maximize wealth or
other social welfare goals."223 Opponents' argument also ignores the reality
that the federal statutory regime of common carriage was enacted not
because common carriage obligations were not needed, but because the
common law remedies relying on judicial litigation by customers were
considered inadequate; states lacked jurisdiction over interstate commerce;
and reliance on competition was deemed insufficient to protect customers
224
from unreasonable discriminatory practices in interstate commerce.
Therefore, to state that pursuit of a deregulatory policy that shifts reliance
on monopoly to competition means that common carriage obligations are
no longer appropriate is simply wrong. Rather, such an assertion is a
radical one, particularly when viewed in light of deregulatory policies
adopted for transportation common carriers.
In responding to implications of Comcast Corp. v. Federal
Communications Commission, it is unclear which framing of inquiry the
FCC will accept in considering what baseline obligations should be
imposed on broadband Internet access service providers. Thus far,
comments filed in Broadband Industry Practices represent a conflict in
framing-the perspective of network neutrality supporters focuses on
historical precedent and empirical realities of corporate economic power of
broadband access service providers relative to their customers or
competitors, whereas the perspective of network neutrality opponents is
based on theoretical analysis ripped from historical context and dismissal
of the reasons underlying the lineage of legal precedent. The framing that
the FCC, or Congress, accepts will determine whether the FCC's recent
radical policy trajectory will be extended or reversed. 2 25 The differential
221. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1, 59 (1998).
222. Id. at 82 (internal quotation omitted).
223. Id. at 4.
224. CULLOM REPORT, supra note 171, at 176-78.
225. Illustrative analyses of network neutrality opponents are found in the Economists'
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impacts between such potential future trajectories are dramatic, and further
complicated by the new trajectory initiated by Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission.

VI. THE COMBINATORIAL EFFECT OF THE COURT'S AND FCC'S
DECISIONS
Two vital interests of individuals converge in a broadband network,
reflecting both economic and free speech rights of individuals, which arise
from individuals' dual roles as citizens of a representative democracy and
participants in a capitalist economy. Distinctive legal principles have
evolved to protect individuals' interests in both the political and economic
systems of the U.S. To enforce these principles and to effectuate their
enforcement as society evolves with technological innovation, government
regulation itself evolves.
An important evolution of government regulation has been its
adaptation to the realities of the rise of corporate power. Corporations are
legal entities, deriving their very existence from government, and have
unique characteristics that distinguish them from human beings. Although
these characteristics enable amassing of capital and wealth that provide
many benefits to society, they also increase the capacity to exercise
corporate power with potentially great destructive consequences in both the
political and economic systems. For this reason, government regulation has
evolved to enable the beneficial as well as the harmful impacts of
corporations on both individual and collective interests. Such evolution is
reflected in the campaign financing laws at issue in Citizens United v.
FederalElection Commission and the statutory regime of common carriage
at issue in the FCC's classification of broadband Internet access services.
Unfortunately, in the more recent era of deregulatory policies, the
reasons and purposes of underlying legal principles and attendant
development of government regulation have often been ignored. The
failure to conduct analysis in appropriate temporal context has led to
radical departures from historical legal precedent in recent cases, such as
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FederalElection
Letter, supra note 219, and Letter from Kyle McStarrow (NCTA), Steve Largent (CTIA),
Walter B. McCormick (USTA), Grant Seiffert (TIA), Curt Stamp (ITTA), Thomas J. Tauke
(Verizon), James W. Cicconi (AT&T), Gail MacKinnon (Time Warner Cable), and Steve
Davis (Qwest) to Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman at 1, Preserving the Open Internet;
Broadband Industry Practices; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, FCC GN Docket
No. 09-191 (rel. Feb. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Letter]. My own analysis is provided in
Comments of Prof. Barbara A. Cherry, Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Internet
Practices, FCC GN Docket No. 09-191 (rel. Jan. 14, 2010), and Reply Comments of Prof.
Barbara A. Cherry, Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Internet Practices, FCC GN
Docket No. 09-191 (rel. Apr. 27, 2010).
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Commission and the FCC's reclassification of broadband Internet access
service as an information service without a separable telecommunications
service component.
The approaches of both the U.S. Supreme Court and the FCC bear
similar flaws. They are both based on ahistorical and nonempirical
analyses, and they appear motivated simply by disagreement with
precedent and a preference for the absence of regulation. They both
mischaracterize legal precedent and ignore the public function of
corporations that has long subjected them to comprehensive regulation in
the service of the public welfare. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court
ignores the historical reality that the nation's founders had the protection of
individuals in mind under the First Amendment; and the FCC ignores the
origins of common carriage as embodying fundamental relational norms in
economic transactions. Critically, they both ignore the rise of corporate
power and the historical attendant need for federal government regulation
to protect interests of individuals from the exercise of such power-from
the corruptive influence in elections and from oppressive and unreasonable
economic discrimination in common carriage services. In this regard, they
fail to consider the distinctive features of corporations as compared to
human beings, and therefore they ignore the underlying reasons for, and
historically permissive scope of, regulation to distinguish between them.
The consequences of the U.S. Supreme Court and FCC decisions are
indeed profound. Continuing along and combining the trajectories of these
decisions will seriously weaken the economic and free speech rights of
individuals as compared to those of corporations with regard to access to
broadband infrastructure.
As previously discussed in Section IV, a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny as a result of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
would strengthen First Amendment challenges by broadband Internet
access service providers, thereby diminishing the government's ability to
impose access mandates for purposes of viewpoint diversity. Furthermore,
in order to preserve neutrality of regulation among technology platforms of
broadband access service providers, Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission may even further elevate First Amendment rights of
corporations as an obstacle to imposition of broadband obligations, such as
those being considered by the FCC in BroadbandIndustry Practices.
As discussed in Part V.B.2, common carriage obligations are based on
legal norms that constitute an early form of consumer protection to enduser
customers. Due to the existence of such obligations prior to development of
general business laws, the elimination of these obligations by the FCC's
classification of broadband Internet access services as information services
without a separable telecommunications component has left enduser
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customers without civil recourse for violation of the underlying relational
norms. Furthermore, given the uncertain validity of the essential facilities
doctrine under antitrust law under Verizon v. Trinko,22 6 the elimination of
the common carriage provision of the underlying telecommunications for
use by unaffiliated ISPs has also jeopardized the availability of a legal
remedy to such ISPs. It is these legal gaps that created the necessity for the
Broadband Industry Practices; and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission now provides the legal basis for blocking imposition of
baseline obligations on broadband access providers in that proceeding.
Important differences between corporations and individuals that are
ignored by the U.S. Supreme Court and the FCC bear further emphasis, as
adverse consequences arise from viewing the dangers of corporate power
too narrowly. As Justice Stevens observes, "corporations have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. ... [T]hey are
not themselves members of 'We the People' by whom and for whom our
Constitution was established." 22 7 "Corporate speech . . . is derivative
speech, a speech by proxy."2 28 Moreover, "[t]he legal structure of
corporations allows them to amass and deploy financial resources on a
scale few natural persons can match," 22 9 and "[c]orporations . . . are
uniquely equipped .

.

. not simply because they have a lot of money but

because of their legal and organizational structure." 230 Consequently,
"corporations' 'war chests' and their special 'advantages' in the legal realm
... may translate into special advantages in the market for legislation." 231
Such legal and organizational structure of corporations may translate into
special advantages over human beings in the markets of a capitalist
economy as well, as seen from the history of common carriers.
These special advantages of corporations have now been further
enhanced by the radical departures from historical legal precedent in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and the FCC's
reclassification of information services. The Court's failure in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission to acknowledge competing First
Amendment interests between corporations and human beings is
particularly problematic when media corporations are involved. As Justice
Stevens notes, although difficult, a balancing of interests is required.
However, given the power imbalance between media corporations and the
226. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410-411 (2004).
227. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Conm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

228. Id.
229. Id. at 974.
230. Id. at 975.
231. Id. (citation omitted).
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individuals they serve, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
foreshadows the effective enabling of such corporations' interests to
supersede those of individuals. Yet the direct role played by media
corporations in the nation's communications infrastructure, in which
citizens not only conduct commerce but also become informed and
participate in a representative democracy, requires heightened attention to
the dangers of these particular corporations' ability to exercise their
economic power to the detriment of individuals and the collective interest
of the nation. Unfortunately, the recent loss of historical legal remedies and
reduced scope of constitutionally permissible governmental interventions
impedes the necessary caution. Overall, the combinatorial or interactive
effect of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and the FCC's
reclassification of broadband access (as an information service without a
separable telecommunications service component) is the effective elevation
of the free speech rights of corporations to wield their economically
derived wealth above both the economic and free speech rights of
individuals.
VII. NEW FCC RULES REINFORCE THE COMBINATORIAL
EFFECT WITH CITIZENS UNITED
After this Article was first written, the FCC issued a Report and
Order232 in Broadband Industry Practices. In its Report and Order, the
FCC adopted three basic rules for preserving the open Internet.233 The first
rule is based on the principle of transparency, requiring fixed and mobile
broadband providers to disclose network management practices,
performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of broadband
services.234 The second rule prohibits fixed broadband providers from
blocking lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices,
subject to reasonable network management; it also prohibits mobile
broadband from blocking lawful websites or applications that compete with
their voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable network
management. 23 5 The third rule provides that fixed broadband providers may
not "unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic," and
"[r]easonable network management shall not constitute unreasonable
discrimination. 23 6
Importantly, the FCC adopted these rules based on Title I ancillary

232. Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 52 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2010)
[hereinafter FCC 10-201].
233. Id. at para. 1.
234. Id. at para. 54.
235. Id. at paras. 63, 99.
236. Id. at para. 68.
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jurisdiction, deciding to retain classification of broadband Internet access
service as an information service. By declining to reclassify broadband
Internet access service (more specifically, the transmission component) as a
Title II telecommunications service, the FCC continues along its radical
policy trajectory and potentially strengthens likely First Amendment
constitutional challenges to these rules.
Anticipating First Amendment arguments, the FCC asserts that
"broadband providers typically are best described not as 'speakers,' but
rather as conduits for speech." 2 3 7 Furthermore, the FCC asserts that
broadband Internet access service does not involve an exercise of editorial
discretion comparable to that of cable companies.238 For these reasons, the
FCC finds that the underlying transmission service is not speech, stating
"[t]elephone common carriers, for instance, transmit users' speech for hire,
but no court has ever suggested that regulation of common carriage
arrangements triggers First Amendment scrutiny."239 In this regard, the
FCC disagrees with the reasoning in two cases in which federal district
courts concluded that the provision of broadband service is speech
protected under the First Amendment. 2 40 The FCC's ability to rely on its
characterization of broadband as merely a conduit of speech is problematic
at best, given its previous classification of the service as noncommon
carriage and on the basis of the lack of a separable transmission
component.
Even if their rules do affect speech of broadband providers, the FCC
asserts that the rules do not violate the First Amendment. In this respect,
the rules would be subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny, and
this standard would be met by the government interests underlying the
Report and Order to protect the speech interests of all Internet speakers.24 '
Finally, the FCC states that speaker-based distinctions are permitted when
justified by some special characteristic of the medium being regulated"here the ability of broadband providers to favor or disfavor Internet traffic
to the detriment of innovation, investment, competition, public discourse,

and end users." 24 2
In his dissenting statement, Commissioner McDowell claims that the
FCC ruling too lightly dismisses likely constitutional challenges by
broadband Internet service providers under the First Amendment. First, he
faults the Report and Order for ostensibly avoiding classification of
237. Id. at para.141.

238. Id.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at para. 144 (footnote omitted).
Id. at para. 143 n.458 (citations omitted).
Id. at paras. 145-46.
Id. at para. 145.
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broadband providers as Title II common carriers, but then dismissing
broadband ISPs as mere conduits of speech undeserving of First
Amendment protection.24 3 Second, he questions the Report and Order's
assertion that broadband ISPs perform no editorial function with First
Amendment protection. 244 Third, he asserts "it is undisputed that broadband
ISPs merit First Amendment protection when using their own platforms to
provide multichannel video programming services and similar offerings" 245
and, furthermore, the Report and Order fails to address the second prong of
the intermediate scrutiny test, which requires the regulatory means to not
burden substantially more speech than is necessary.246
The contrasting positions of the majority and Commissioner
McDowell are competing arguments related to First Amendment
constitutional challenges likely to be raised upon appeal of the Report and
Order. In this respect, a further assertion by Commissioner Copps
foreshadows the importance of broadband providers as corporations and the
need to balance interests of corporations and human beings.
Allowing gigantic corporations-in many cases, monopoly or duopoly,
broadband Internet access service providers-to exercise unfettered
control over Americans' access to the Internet not only creates risks to
technological innovation and economic growth, but it poses a real
threat to freedom of speech and the future of our democracy.... Our
future town square will be paved with broadband bricks. It must be
accessible to all-not handed over to a handful of gatekeepers who can
control our access.247
To the extent that broadband Internet service providers are speakers under
the First Amendment, Commissioner Copps's statement emphasizes a
speaker-based distinction between broadband providers as corporations and
the human individuals to whom they are to provide access. Framed in this
way, clearly there are competing First Amendment interests between
corporations and human beings-as expressly recognized by Justice
Stevens in dissent, but avoided by the Court in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission Applying the analysis in Citizens United v. Federal

Election Commission, which fails to acknowledge such competing
interests, to consideration of constitutional challenges to the FCC network

243. Preserving the Open Internet, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert M.
McDowell, Report and Order, 52 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2010) [hereinafter McDowell
Dissenting Statement]. In this regard, he also disagrees with the assertion in the Report and
Order that common carriage arrangements do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. See
FCC 10-201, supranote 232, at para. 140.
244. McDowell Dissenting Statement, supra note 243, at 26.
245. Id. at 27.
246. Id.
247. Preserving the Open Internet, Concurring Statement of Commissioner Michael J.
Copps, Report and Order, 52 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2010).
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neutrality rules will effectively elevate the free speech rights of
corporations to wield their economically derived wealth above the
economic and free speech rights of individuals.
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